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In handing down its decision in In Re Gault, 1 the Su-
preme Court extended to youths accused of delinquent acts 
certain constitutional rights heretofore reserved for adults 
in criminal proceedings, i.e., the right against self-incrimina-
tion and the rights to timely notice of charges, counsel and 
confrontation of witnesses. In arriving at its far-reaching 
decision, the Court confirmed what many critics of the 
juvenile court movement had been saying for years: that 
this nation's juvenile courts are beset with serious problems 
in handling the task for which they were specifically cre-
ated-the "non-criminal" adjudication and treatment of 
delinquent children. 
The Gault opinion reveals that the majority decision was 
apparently founded as much on social science "fact" as it 
was on more fundamental principles of legal reasoning. 
Indeed, it is apparent that the Court was in somewhat of a 
dilemma in trying to prove that juvenile courts were, in 
fact, not fulfilling the promise of their founders. Paramount 
among the Court's considerations in this regard were the 
observations: l)thatjuvenile crime has increased, not de-
creased, since the establishment of the juvenile justice sys-
tem;2 2) that a "delinquency" label is inherently stigma-
tizing;3 3) that the manner in which a youth perceives the 
legal system has profound effects on his future develop-
ment as an adult member of society4 and; 4) that insti-
tutionalization, even for treatment purposes, is nonetheless 
involuntary deprivation of liberty .s 
This article will attempt three tasks in a review of the 
Gault decision and its potential consequences for the Amer-
ican juvenile justice system. First, the social science materi-
als used by the Court will be critically examined in terms of 
their social science relevance to the decision made. Second, 
the proposition will be advanced that the burden of the 
Gault decision now falls on the shoulders of defense coun-
sel, a burden which is not unlikely to cause severe role 
strain. Finally, a plea will be entered for the co-operative 
effort of law and the social sciences in implementing truly 
"experimental" programs aimed at delinquency prevention. 
Crime and Recidivism Rates as Indicators of Juve-
nile Court Failure 
In assessing the relative benefits of the juvenile justice 
system, the majority opinion relies heavily on a study of 
juvenile recidivism conducted for the President's Commis-
sion on Crime in the District of Columbia. The opinion 
quotes the report and states: 
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" 'In fiscal I 966 approximately 66 per cent of the I 6-
and I 7-year-old juveniles referred to the court by You th 
Aid Division had been before the court previously. In I 965, 
56 per cent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. 
The SRI study revealed that 61 per cent of the sample Juve-
nile Court referrals in I 965 had been previously referred at 
least once and that 42 per cent had been referred at least 
twice before.' ... "Certainly, these figures and the high 
crime rates among juveniles to which we have re-
ferred .... could not lead us to conclude that the absence 
of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the 
juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibi-
tions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or 
rehabilitate offenders."6 
The Court's reasoning, from a rigorous social science per-
spective, leaves much to be desired. In drawing the conclu-
sion that the juvenile justice system has been ineffective in 
curbing rising crime rates, the Court fails to use one of so-
cial science's most powerful inferential tests: a comparable 
"control group"-in this instance, of delinquency cases 
which have been processed through some system other than 
the juvenile courts.7 In short, it is possible to state an 
equally plausible relationship between crime rates and juve-
nile courts-that without the same system of juvenile jus-
tice, juvenile crime rates would be even greater than the 
figures cited. This example may strike some as implausible, 
but the logic of social inquiry views both of these state-
ments as equally plausible or implausible until they have 
been rigorously tested-which, as many writers have clearly 
indicated, has never been done.8 
A final critique of the use of recidivism statistics goes to 
the nature of the figures themselves. Although it is proper 
to infer that recidivism is high among the juveniles in the 
courts surveyed, we are left wondering about the popula-
tion of youths processed through the courts who never 
return-certainly as important a figure for the Court's argu-
ment as the recidivism rate cited. In other words, it is possi-
ble to suggest that a substantial proportion of juveniles 
handled by the juvenile courts are not recidivists, a figure 
which could only have been obtained by looking at the 
total juvenile population over time to see how many do not 
return to the juvenile court. 
Stigmatizing Effects of a Juvenile Record 
The majority opinion relies heavily on the assumption 
that the juvenile court experience is a "stigmatizing" one. 
"[I] t is frequently said that juveniles are protected by the 
process from disclosure of their deviational behavior. ... 
This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than reali-
ty. Disclosure of court records is discretionary with the 
judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory restrictions almost 
invariably apply only to the court records, and even as to 
those the evidence is that many courts routinely furnish 
information to the FBI and the military, and on request to 
government agencies and even to private employers."9 
This charge, if true, is one of the Court's most convincing 
arguments for extending constitutional rights to juveniles, 
for if a juvenile court does indeed fail in protecting the 
youth from the future use of juvenile records, it may be 
said fairly that it has failed in one of its primary missions. 
The problem with the assertion of potential stigmatizing 
effects, however, is that it is based more on common sense 
than on hard fact. To the best of my knowledge, only one 
rigorous study has ever been made on the potential stigma-
tizing effects of criminal sanctions, IO and none has been 
done in the juvenile justice field. But even granting the 
Court's assumption that juvenile records are used and that 
they harm the youth in subsequent years, wouldn't it be 
better to impose more effective safeguards on the confiden-
tiality of the records than to reform the whole adjudicative 
process? Rigid restrictions on the use of juvenile records 
and provisions for their expungement would seem to go a 
long way toward obviating the severity of the·Court's 
charges in this regard. 
Moreover, records are kept on almost all critical areas of a 
person's life-even on the status and condition of the family 
at any given point in time. I I The critique leveled at the 
juvenile courts by the Supreme Court, then, extends 
equally to education, credit, security, army and IRS files. It 
would appear, then, that it is not the record per se which 
constitutes the core of the problem; rather, it is the illegiti-
mate (and legitimate) use of all such records. If this is in-
deed the real issue, it does little good to damn juvenile 
courts for what is a more general problem in any modern 
record-keeping society. 
The Juvenile Court's Effect on Youthful Offenders 
In assessing the impact of traditional juvenile court proce-
dures on juveniles, the majority opinion sharply criticizes 
the presumed benefits to the juvenile of the informality of 
the proceedings. 
" ... [R] ecent studies have, with surprising unanimity, 
entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle con-
ception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the 
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, 
the essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and 
more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is con-
cerned ... [W] hen the procedural laxness of the 'parens 
patriae' attitude is followed by stern disciplining, the con-
trast may have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels 
that he has been deceived or enticed .... Unless appropriate 
due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has 
violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated 
and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court 
personnet."I 2 (Emphasis added) 3
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In drawing these conclusions, the Court relies heavily on a 
small booklet entitled Juvenile Delinquency: Its Prevention 
and Controt. 13 In fact, the Court cites it several times in 
making statements about the probable effects of the juve-
nile justice system on juveniles. This booklet, however, is 
not, and does not purport to be, a report of actual findings. 
Rather, the authors, sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell of the 
Russell Sage Foundation, are careful to point out that their 
report was designed to provide " ... a brief overview of 
major problems, issues, and developments in the field of 
juvenile delinquency in the United States."14 Indeed, re-
cent studies on the attitudes of youthful offenders suggest 
that for many there is little understanding of the system 
and consequently little perception of an "unfairness." 15 
Furthermore, there is as yet unreleased data from an experi-
mental study of two juvenile courts in two cities, one "tra-
ditional" and one "legalistic" in procedural form, which 
clearly indicate that overall, relatively few of the juveniles 
processed through either system regard the system as "un-
just.~•16 
In this study, another part of which is described later in 
this article, youths were assigned at random to project at-
torneys who had substantially lower case-loads than the 
normal legal aid attorney. Of the two juvenile courts, Ze-
nith's was by far the more "legalistic," relying on the bifur-
cated hearing, the presence of a state's attorney and gener-
ally more formalized procedures. These elements were lack-
ing in Gotham's juvenile court, which was classified as "tra-
ditionalistic." As Table I indicates, the data for these two 
cities is quite clearly in accord with data provided by other 
studies. 
Table I 
Zenith: Of boys using unfavorable words, (N=273) the per-
centage of words indicating: 
l . Sense of injustice 
2. No sense of injustice 
Gotham: (N=l85) 
1. Sense of injustice 
2. No sense of injustice 
Project Attorney All Other Cases 











In sum, therefore, the Supreme Court's analysis of material 
bearing on this problem rested heavily on intelligent guess-
work rather than on hard empirical testing. 
Institutionalization as Involuntary Loss of Liberty 
In its final major justification of the extension of consti-
tutional rights to minors, the Court comments on the puni-
tive nature of the institutionalization process. 
"The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the 
title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juve-
niles is an institution of confinement in which the child is 
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes 
'a building with white-washed walls, regimented routine and 
institutional laws .... 'Instead of mother and father and 
sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is 
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delin-
quents' confined with him for anything from waywardness 
to rape and homicide."! 7 
This is, indeed, a most damning statement, for it strikes 
right at the heart of the traditional view that the juvenile 
justice process can be humane and rehabilitative. Moreover, 
its importance to the decision is underscored by the fact 
that Gault applies only in cases of possible incarceration.18 
But a look at the relevant data calls the truth of this state-
ment into question. Recent research by Margaret Q. Warren 
in California indicates quite clearly that for certain types of 
youths (diagnosed by "maturity levels" of emotional devel-
opment), institutionalization offers a more favorable prog-
nosis than release into the community_ 19 The lack of faith 
in "rehabilitative" programs is classically justified by their 
failure to show any positive treatment effect. But as Mar-
garet Warren's study shows, this failure may be more prop-
erly attributed to inadequate research methodologies. More-
over, carefully run experimental programs which attempt to 
maximize treatment-holding aside, for the moment, the 
question of control groups-do show positive treatment 
results. 20 
In addition, the popularly held belief that the home envi-
ronment is necessarily better than the institution is not 
justified either. The large number of neglect and "battered 
child" cases heard in this country makes it doubtful that 
the time-honored adage is as correct as it is thought to be. 
Here again, institutionalization has a benefit which should 
have been considered by t~e Court in Gault. 
The Gault Decision and the Lawyer's Dilemma 
However unwarranted the reliance on social science rea-
soning might have been in the majority opinion, it is obvi-
ous that Gault is now the law of the land, and when it is 
fully implemented in this nation's various juvenile courts,21 
much of the burden of the constitutional protections will 
fall squarely on the shoulders of defense counsel. 
75 
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In addressing itself to the role of lawyers in delinquency 
hearings, the Court stated, " ... recognition of the right to 
counsel involves no necessary interference with the special 
purposes of juvenile court procedures; indeed, it seems that 
counsel can play an important role in the process of rehabil-
itation."22 
These references to the potential role of defense counsel 
are underscored by an earlier statement of the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, which suggested a role 
for defense counsel in delinquency cases. 
"Does the lawyer in juvenile court have an additional duty 
to present facts coming to his attention which may lead to 
an adjudication of delinquency or neglect or a supervisory 
order? Disclosure [to the court] of facts pointing to the 
need for treatment may be viewed as consistent with the 
child's ultimate interest, and should be presented to him 
and his parents. This disclosure may be viewed as a fulfill-
ment of the duty the attorney must assume, as an officer of 
the court, in any proceeding involving more than merely 
private interests, to the court and the community as well as 
to his client."23 
What then, beyond insuring basic procedural rights, 
should the duty of the defense counsel to his youthful 
client be-especially in those cases where it is apparent (at 
least superficially) that the client would probably benefit 
from a court-imposed treatment program? The answer is at 
best cloudy, and it becomes even more obscure if hard data 
are taken into consideration in the attempt to resolve the 
dilemma. 
Relevant Data Considered 
In a major experimental effort to determine precisely 
what the impact of law counsel would be on juvenile court 
procedure, lawyers were introduced into several selected 
juvenile courts from 1966 to 1968.24 Data reported in this 
article reflect the findings from only one of the partici-
pating cities, code-named Zenith. It is to be noted, in refer-
ence to Table II, that when project attorneys (lawyers spe-
cially picked and trained in juvenile court procedure) were 
introduced during the course of the project, there was a 
dramatic and marked shift to what might be considered 
more "lenient" dispositions. Not only were outright dismis-
sals increased (over all other cases by about 14 per cent), 
but the ratio of continuances without findings25 jumped 
by 8.5 per cent. All this, of course, points to a dramatic 
reduction of cases in which the court chose to impose offi-
cial jurisdiction, either by some form of probation or by 
commitment proceedings against the accused youth. 
Table II 
Outcomes of Delinquency Cases in Zenith-Project Lawyers 
Compared to All Other Cases-both represented and un-
representec 
Project Cases All Other Cases 
% % 
Petition Dismissed 54.2 40.3 
(I 16) (169) 
Delinquency not formally 12.6 4.1 
entered-case continued (27) (17) 
under court supervision 
without finding. 
Probation 26.2 43.4 
(56) (182) 
Commitment 7.0 12.2 
(15) (5 I) 
100.0 100.0 
(214) (410) 
All this should not be especially surprising to the prac-
ticed and hardened professional trial attorney. After all, 
lawyers are supposed to make a difference in the outcomes 
of cases, and if that difference lies in the direction of a 
greater number of dismissals, then it is in full accord with 
the American system of justice, which claims the presump-
tion of innocence for all those against whom the state can-
not produce sufficient evidence to prove guilt. 
Nevertheless, the juvenile court project has turned up 
troublesome information which may lead to disquieting 
fears that the truth of the foregoing proposition is not as 
self-evident as it might first appear. As an integral part of 
the project, the lawyers were asked to fill out detailed re-
ports on their cases, including information relevant to the 
theory and manner of defense (if any), the attitudes of the 
court towards their performance and-especially relevant to 
the present discussion-a statement of the youth's admis-
sion or denial of the offense. This last bit of information 
was later correlated with the actual performance of the 
lawyer in the courtroom in the entering of an admission or 
a denial. 
Of the 214 cases actually represented during the time of 
the project, 188 usable case reports were turned in and 
coded for relevant research information. Table III reveals 
some startling figures: in a full IO per cent (I 9) of the cases 
in which the client admitted full involvement in the delin-
quent act to his lawyer, a denial was entered in court, with 
a success ratio (counted as dismissals) of 68 per cent. An-
other five cases in which the juvenile admitted partial in-
volvement to his lawyer and subsequently entered a denial 
in court were dismissed. In sum, therefore, it may be said 
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Table III 
Relationship Between Plea and Disposition of Case 
Lawyer & Youth 
Agree on Ad- Youth Admits 
mission Lawyer Denies 
% % 
Case Dismissed 15.8 68.4 
(9) (13) 
Delinquency not formally 32.6 10.5 
entered-case continued (18) (2) 
under court supervision 
for limited time. 
Probation 42.8 15.8 
(26) (3) 




that in a full 12.6 per cent of those cases where guilt was 
admitted and known to the lawyer, a not-guilty plea was 
entered. And when we note how many of these cases result-
ed in distnissal, we find that there is a 75 per cent "win" 
ratio (18/24). 
We cannot report, of course, on the number of "inno-
cent" victims who might have been adjudicated guilty had 
the lawyers not participated in the defense of the case. This 
is a matter that must be left to pure speculation. It would 
appear, however, that one of the worst fears of juvenile 
court traditionalists has been justified: the appearance of 
adversary-minded defense counsel at delinquency hearings 
results in the freeing into society of unrepentant and un-
regenerated youth. It might be argued in rebuttal that if the 
offenses committed were minor in nature or the youths of 
tender years, then the attitude of the lawyer in defense 
might be justified "in the benign light of traditional juvenile 
court philosophy." A profile of Zenith's 19 cases of full 
denial in the face of the youth's full admission sheds con-
siderable doubt on this hypothesis. Only two of these cases 
could be considered in the younger, 10-12 age range, while 
the majority fell in the 13-14 area. Neither were the of-
fenses committed either "minor" or "juvenile" in nature; 
all would have been classified as felonies if the offender had 
been an adult. Of the nineteen, we recorded three as 
"crimes against persons" (15.8 per cent), seven as posses-
sion of a deadly weapon (36.8 per cent), eight as "crimes 
against property" ( 42.l per cent), and a final case was 
logged as "possession of marijuana." Nor, apparently, can 
these youths be exculpated by virtue of spotless records: 
Youth Admits to Youth Admits to 
Youth & Lawyer Part of Offense, Part of Offense 
Agree on Denial Lawyer Admits Lawyer Denies Totals 
% % % 
79.0 55.9 
(79) (l) (5) (107) 
2.0 (2) 12.7 
(2) (24) 





(JOO) (7) (5) (188) 
less than half ( 42.1 per cent) had no prior record of any 
kind; while five (26.3 per cent) had prior police records, 
three (15 .8 per cent) were currently on probation, and an 
equal number had prior juvenile court records but were not 
on probation at the time the petition was filed. 
The power of the project attorney to take advantage of 
the adversary system is apparent from the disposition of 
these nineteen cases. The state was unable to prove its 
charge in six cases, and four cases were dismissed due to the 
failure of necessary witnesses to show at the adjudicatory 
hearing. Moreover, the state chose not to prosecute in three 
of the cases. Only one of the youths was committed and 
three placed on probation, while the remaining two were 
given the relatively light judicial notice of a continuance 
without finding. 
In presenting "every defense that the law of the land per-
mits,"26 Zenith's attorneys were clearly well within the 
bounds of the Canons of Professional Ethics as applied to 
criminal proceedings. But can it be argued that these Can-
ons of Ethics extend equally to juvenile cases? After all, 
even Gault limited its holdings to only those cases where 
incarceration was likely, and it is a time-honored argument 
that youths are by definition only partially socialized hu-
man beings in terms of their rights of citizenship. Moreover, 
does not the defense attorney have some obligation to the 
broader issues of public safety and the protection of the 
social order by helping to apprehend and remove from soci-
ety those who are a menace to it?2 7 
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These issues can easily be answered by the criminal trial 
lawyer, whose professional job it is to uphold the normative 
ethic of the protection of the individual against the im-
mense coercive power of the state.28 Given this ethic, 
Zenith's attorneys can find no fault with their behavior-
but, as illustrated by the following case, it may be argued 
that there is a higher good to be served than the unrestrict-
ed use of the adversary system. 
C.W., for example, was a thirteen-year-old with a prior 
station-house record of eighteen arrests for curfew and bur-
glary and two prior court referrals for burglary, for which 
he was on probation at the time of an additional filing for 
burglary. Between the time of intake and the initial adjudi-
catory hearing, C.W. was arrested again for criminal trespass 
to a vehicle. In presenting C.W.'s case, the defense counsel 
was able to persuade the prosecutor that the state did not 
have sufficient evidence to uphold the second charge. The 
initial petition was also dismissed, much to the probation 
officers' dismay' through the use of a legal technicality: the 
complaining witness was an invalid and, being housebound, 
could not appear in court to testify to the allegation of 
burglary from her home. 
It is clear that Zenith's defense attorney was quite suc-
cessful in obtaining the most favorable disposition of the 
case, a complete dismissal on the grounds that the state was 
either unwilling or unable to prosecute the charges. Defense 
counsel's "success" was in keeping C.W. from being com-
mitted (in all probability) to the "care and custody" of the 
State Youth Commission. In doing so, he was also clearly 
acting on the wishes of C.W. and his mother, who were 
apparently quite adamant in not wanting C.W. to receive 
such a disposition. The full moral dilemma facing counsel, 
however, is revealed in the following data from the case 
report. 
"It might also be added that the comfortable bromide, in 
these circumstances, home is as good as anything, may not 
be acceptable either. There seems no real question that Mrs. 
W. is an alcoholic, and that the home circumstances are 
very close to intolerable. None of the children go to school, 
because Mrs. W. is now living with a sister of hers and does 
not want to enroll the children and then have them trans-
ferred. At the same time, she has been with this sister for 
some six to eight months, and according to the probation 
officer, has taken no steps towards moving, however often 
she asserts that she intends to do so in the near future. It is 
his belief that she really has no plans for moving in the near 
future, and that as a result, the children are not going to go 
to school in the near future. The apartment in which they 
are living is very badly overcrowded, and the living condi-
tions are pretty close to impossible. 
"One may further ask whether or not the simple fact that 
C. went to school would be meaningful. He claims physical 
distress while attending classes including ringing in his ears, 
and there is every reason to believe that he is subject to 
some rather vicious teasing because of the scar on his head. 
Further, his I.Q. is right around the mental retardation 
level, and his performance is severely handicapped by his 
emotional difficulties. To the best of my knowledge there is 
no institution within the control of the Board of Education 
which is suited to a boy with his difficulties, and, as ob-
served above, it does not seem that there is any institution 
in the State which is suited, as a practical matter, to his 
needs." 
I submit that the case ofC.W., although extreme in its 
implications and dimensions, is not altogether unusual 
when an essentially adversarial stance is taken in the juve-
nile courtroom and when, consequently, it is assumed that 
there are no reconcilable interests between the state and the 
accused delinquent. 
The decision in Gault, therefore, contributes little to the 
reconciliation of the traditional juvenile court ideals with 
the norms of due process. Rather, it shifts the burden of 
the application of these norms from the judge, who used to 
face the juvenile alone, to an arena in which defense coun-
sel is pitted against the state (and there is growing pressure 
for the state to be represented by a prosecutor). It is this 
shift, we submit, that places an unconscionable dual role 
on the attorney. For in the many cases in which he is cer-
tain of his client's complicity, either through admission or 
the marshalling of facts, he must make the sometimes criti-
cal decision of what to plead upon entering the courtroom, 
a decision which places upon him the strain of being both 
judge and defense counsel. 
It is granted, once again, that this double role is not a 
problem for the criminal process; the norms of "treatment" 
and "rehabilitation" are the problems and goals of con-
structive penology, not of the adjudicative process. It is to 
be remembered, however, that the original purpose and 
function of the juvenile court was to provide rehabilitative 
services without the stigmatizing effects of a criminal rec-
ord. It is also a time-honored truism that youth is, by its 
very nature, maleable. Obviously, one of the primary func-
tions of society is the socialization of youth into the mores 
of the parent culture. When the primary agents of socializa-
tion (such as the family) break down, and when the child 
does not respond to the secondary agents of sodalization 
(such as the school), doesn't an affirmative burden fall on 
the state to provide alternative services for the same or 
comparable ends? 
How, then, are the seemingly contradictory goals of re-
habilitation and strictly applied due process to be recon-
ciled in the new model of the juvenile court as envisioned 
by Gault? 
7
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The answer, far from simple in its application, lies in the 
closer co-operation of the methodology of social science 
and the legal system. In this, I join others who advocate an 
"experimenting society" and an adversarial model of social 
science methodologies.29 Using the case ofC.W. as an ex-
ample, it might have been possible to have investigated 
thoroughly, in a quasi-judicial manner not pertaining to the 
adjudication of the case, potential alternative treatment 
possibilites. This could have been done by C.W .'s lawyer in 
conjunction with a team (or opposing teams) of social sci-
entists. If it could have been determined that there were 
appropriate facilities for C.W ., then it might fairly be said 
that the lawyer would have been under some obligation to 
enter an admission to the court, while at the same time 
recommending to the court the appropriateness of such 
services. If no such services were available, then it would 
seem to be possible for the lawyer to petition the state to 
make them available, consistent with the principles of the 
juvenile court movement. This solution, however, envisions 
two basic elements: first, that expert testimony be sought 
and that it be sought from more than one source (for differ-
ent experts arrive at their opinions through different meth-
odologies); and second, that legislation be enacted which 
would permit an admission of guilt without the court neces-
sarily taking official notice of the case. 
Of these two elements, the second is perhaps the more 
easily realizable, for many juvenile courts allow either for-
mally or informally a type of interim supervision order 
which does not confer the delinquency label upon the 
accused juvenile. After a period of time, and pending good 
behavior, the petition is usually marked dismissed, and the 
juvenile is found not delinquent. Indeed, the state juvenile 
court act which governs Zenith's juvenile court may be 
considered an exemplar of such legislation. The "continu-
ance under supervision" portion of the act reads: 
"In the absence of objection made in open court by the 
minor, his parents, guardian, custodian or responsible rela-
tive, the court may, before proceeding to findings and ad-
judication, continue the hearing from time to time, allow-
ing the minor to remain in his own home subject to such 
conditions as to conduct and visitation and supervision by 
the probation officer as the court may prescribe.'' 
It is within the framework of such legislation that the 
defense attorney can operate more freely than he otherwise 
could if the options open to the court were merely "dismis-
sal" and "adjudication." And in this manner, the stage is set 
for a more affirmative bargain which would meet the inter-
ests of both the state and the juvenile. In addition to such 
legislation, provision should also be made for replacing a 
petition of delinquency with a "Minor in Need of Super-
vision" or "Neglected Child" petition, both of which, again, 
allow the state to take formal notice of a case without find-
ing it necessary to determine delinquency. 
The first proposition, the use of social science in the diag-
nosis of pre-adjudicative cases, is perhaps the more difficult 
to either envision or put into practice. In the first place, it 
will require that social scientists demand of themselves a 
commitment to the "experimenting society," 
" ... one which vigorously tries out proposed solutions to 
recurrent problems, which makes hard headed multidimen-
sional evaluations of the outcomes, and where the remedial 
effort seems ineffective, goes on to other possible solutions. 
The focus will be on reality testing and persistence in seek-
ing solutions to problems. The justifications of new pro-
grams will be in terms of the seriousness of the problem, 
not in the claim that we can know for certain in advance 
what therapy will work.''30 
The call for the experimenting society and for the search 
for alternative solutions to the problems of delinquency 
control has several practical ramifications, probably equally 
unpalatable to many lawyers and social scientists alike. 
What it means is that the juvenile, his evaluators and his 
attorney will become part of a continuing evaluational 
scheme which turns back on itself from time to time to 
take a hard-headed look at what it has done and where it is 
going. Thus, in a hundred cases like that of C.W., it would 
be possible to propose outright admission in one half the 
cases and an adjudication of delinquency with its probable 
result, commitment to the state youth authority. In the 
other fifty cases, C.W. would be treated under some alterna-
tive program which did not threaten the delinquency sanc-
tion. And to round out the ideal design, an additional fifty 
cases could be handled in the same way project attorneys 
handled their cases in Zenith. 
The evaluation of this type of test would be able to state, 
on a number of indices, the substantive benefits-or lack of 
benefits-of any or all of the programs. Thus, if it could be 
shown that type-two treatment (without finding of delin-
quency) produced the lowest rate of recidivism and the 
greatest degree of emotional adjustment after a year's time, 
while the other two alternatives produced dramatically 
opposite effects, then it could be affirmatively demon-
strated that this was the preferred path. 
Unfortunately, social science findings are rarely so dra-
matic or clear-cut, and we, as members of the experiment-
ing society, must be aware of, and prepared for, the neces-
sary slippage and failure that inevitably comes with the 
initiation of new programs. But awareness of potential fail-
ure does not mean that we have to succumb to ultimate 
despair. After all, if programs are to be initiated on the 
basis of pure guesswork, isn't it better to try to obtain a 
little more precise knowledge about what we are doing and 
where we are going? 
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But what of my lawyer friends who scream loudly in the 
background that this type of experimenting society neces-
sarily deprives certain juveniles of their constitutional rights 
to a fair trial? I am persuaded by their arguments only inso-
far as certain constitutional issues have already been de-
cided for juveniles, such as the rights under Gault. But I 
would be even more convinced if the court had adopted Mr. 
Justice Black's partial concurrence, which argues that the 
right of juveniles to due process guarantees does not rest on 
social science grounds. 3 l The fact, however, that the major-
ity opinion felt constrained to call upon social science in 
reaching its decision leaves me in some doubt as to whether 
or not it might not have been wiser to selectively test the 
impact of each of the guarantees before applying them 
wholesale to juvenile courts. 
In support of this, I can think of nothing better than Mr. 
Justice Harlan's partial dissent in Gault, a dissent which, it 
seems to me, calls for the very "experimenting society" 
which this article envisions: 
"[I] t should not be forgotten that juvenile crime and 
juvenile courts are both now under earnest study through-
out the country. I very much fear that this Court, by im-
posing these rigid procedural requirements, may inadver-
tently have served to discourage these efforts to find more 
satisfactory solutions for the problems of juvenile crime, 
and may thus now hamper enlightened development of the 
systems of juvenile courts. ,,32 (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Justice Harlan's comments are strangely reminiscent 
of statements by those philosophers of science who have 
cautioned for years against prejudgment on matters of fact. 
Indeed, if the decision in In Re Gault had been made on the 
basis of strictly legal principles, I firmly believe that the 
Court would have been on less shaky ground than it is now. 
For having made its decision on the basis of what appears 
to be social science "fact," it must now face the ultimate 
dictum of social science, of which there is no better spokes-
man than Karl Popper: 
"Two simple examples of methodological rules may be 
given. They will suffice to show that it would be hardly 
suitable to place inquiry into method on the same level as 
purely logical inquiry. 
"(I) The game of science is, in principle, without end. He 
who decides one day that scientific statements do not call 
for any further test, and that they can be regarded as finally 
verified, retires from the game. 
"(2) Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and 
has proved its mettle, it may not be allowed to drop out 
without 'good reason'. A 'good reason' may be, for in-
stance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is 
better testable; or the falsification of one of the conse-
quences of the hypothesis."33 
Law is not an immutable"force which resists time and tide 
in the face of social reality. It seems as though law and so-
cial science have a goal in common-namely, a system of 
justice which serves the public rather than impressing un-
restricted sanctions upon it. If both the legal and the social 
science systems were to unbend a bit from their traditional 
perspectives as unilateral experts, would not we be a little 
better situated to meet common problems on common 
grounds? 
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